I rise to apprise the House of some recent developments in the India China border areas and their implications for our overall bilateral relations. The House is aware that our ties have been abnormal since 2020, when peace and tranquility in the border areas were disturbed as a result of Chinese actions. Recent developments that reflect our continuous diplomatic engagement since then have set our ties in the direction of some improvement. — External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in his first statement to Parliament since India and China reached an agreement in October on patrolling in the Depsang Plains and Demchok. THE Foreign Minister’s articulation of the sensitive border issue with China in his usual suave style provides a peep into India’s policy towards the northern neighbour who has a profound penchant for unpredictability. There is cautious optimism on the future course and at the same time there is a silent acceptance of the complexities of dealing with China. In short, the China problem is big, and spreading not only at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) but also in the neighbourhood. The Dragon’s footprint is prominent in the recent regime-change in Bangladesh.

 

The ouster of Sheikh Hasina Wajed in a sudden uprising in August and subsequent tumult in the country targeting Indian interests and Hindu minorities are byproducts of a well-cultivated strategy by China as it indulged disruptive elements and anti-India forces in Bangladesh. All the developments in Bangladesh bear a clear reflection of China’s “String of Pearls” policy focusing encirclement of India’s neighbourhood. It is now a multiple-front battle for India with China, but in the shadows. A look at India’s immediate neighbourhood reveals the entire China story. There is a conspicuous presence of the Communist China in almost every country in the neighbourhood in various sizes and shapes. Pakistan is a known lackey of China, Sri Lanka is still squirming with Chinese debt, Nepal’s tilt towards Beijing is popping out with every political upheaval in the Himalayan Kingdom, Myanmar’s Tatmadaw (Military Junta) has tacit support of Chinese entities in furthering its dictatorship, Maldives is still under heavy influence of Chinese businesses, Bhutan barely managed to survive Chinese hobnobbing with its discontented political elements, and now Bangladesh has fallen into the Dragon’s trap.

 

It is a hostile neighbourhood India is dealing with. China’s interests in Bangladesh are huge – from economic gains to gaining access for military purposes. Beijing invested heavily in fostering relations with Dhaka with every regime. As part of its geopolitical strategy, Chinese investors dished out alluring proposals for businesses in Bangladesh to wean them away from India. Chinese firms invested over 26 billion dollars in Bangladesh. Around 700 Chinese-funded companies are operating in Desh and despite her close relations with India, even Sheikh Hasina was tempted to keep Beijing in good humour. She was concerned by the growing debt burden and engaged China in building economic ties. It was her trip to China this July which left her disillusioned by Beijing’s tactics and she cut short the visit. Within a month, Sheikh Hasina found herself taking refuge in India. China’s strategy of nurturing anti-India elements in the neighbourhood is a typical playbook employed by nations with imperialistic ambitions. They cultivate relations with the disruptive and disgruntled elements forming opposition to the ruling dispensation, ensure proper funding through various channels and then hit at a vulnerable moment to install their favoured regime. The interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus with support by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) of former PM Khaleda Zia has already made its priorities clear seeking full rendezvous with China.

 

The attacks on Hindu, arrest of ISKCON leader Chinmoy Krishna Das Prabhu, the indifference of Yunus in addressing India’s concerns and the growing influence of radical Islamists in governance are signs of a deeper rot that will test India’s approach to Desh. It is no coincidence that a day after Chinmoy Das Prabhu’s arrest for protesting atrocities against Hindus, the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka hosted a reception of Islamist political parties including Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) chief Shafiqur Rahman. JeI was a key player in triggering the violent movement and ouster of Sheikh Hasina and Rahman’s frequent meetings with Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Men gives further credence to the anti-India manoeuvres under way in Bangladesh.

 

The immediate concern for New Delhi is ensuring the safety of Hindus living in Bangladesh. The violence led by Jamaat-e-Islami has attracted a strong response from Hindus across the world. One of the possible actions suggested in this context is putting pressure on the interim government by snapping economic ties as India is the second biggest trade partner of Desh in Asia. However, it will be a knee-jerk reaction laced with extreme dangers of ceding total ground to China. India cannot afford to lose a traditional ally with rich historic connections to a hegemonic power like China. Two viable options for New Delhi at the moment are, adopting a wait-n-watch policy, and opening backchannels for communication with all players. For a country with geopolitical and geostrategic heft, it is imperative for India to keep all parties engaged. There was a dull phase in communication with all political players which needs a course-correction. With a proactive foreign policy, India can easily cool down frayed nerves in Desh. It is a political necessity to loosen the Dragon’s grip.n