Iran’s Hardline Position

 

 

 

 

 

By JAMES M DORSEY 

 

 

A RECENT Lebanese public opinion poll suggests there may be limits to Iran-backed Shiite militia Hezbollah’s restraint in confronting Israel. It also suggests why Iran feels emboldened by escalating tensions in the Middle East. The poll results are significant with Hezbollah and Israel engaged in tit-for-tat cross border attacks that both parties have sought to contain but could spin out of control at any moment. Hezbollah has wanted to contain the hostilities because a majority of Lebanese oppose their country becoming embroiled in a war, particularly with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warning that Israel could turn Beirut into another Gaza. In the final analysis, the poll, conducted in late November and early December by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, suggested that public support for Iranian-backed militants was on the rise. The poll further indicated that the majority of Lebanese opposed to increased military engagement in support of Gaza is fragile. Various factors could upset the apple cart. These include an unintended escalation of the border hostilities sparked by a large number of civilian casualties, repeated Israeli targeted killings on Lebanese soil of prominent Hezbollah and Hamas figures, a potential International Court of Justice ruling asserting that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza risks genocide in a case submitted by South Africa, and the fallout of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejecting the creation of an independent Palestinian state and insisting that Israel would maintain control of territory conquered in the 1967 Middle East war.

 

Netanyahu’s public rejection of a Palestinian state fit a long-standing pattern of Middle Eastern politics in which hardliners on both sides of various divides reinforce one another. That may be only the icing on Netanyahu’s cake. He did not say anything he had not suggested over the years, which puts the emphasis on the timing of the prime minister’s comments. His reiterated rejection of a Palestinian state was designed to pacify his ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative coalition partners as well as stymie US efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to establish diplomatic relations with Israel that emphasise a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States needs regionalization for Arab buy-in to post-war arrangements in Gaza and the West Bank which is unlikely to be forthcoming without the prospect of a credible peace process. Speaking at the Davos forum, Israeli President Isaac Herzog described relations with Saudi Arabia as a gamechanger and a key to ending the Gaza war. However, that remains a pipedream with the current Israeli Government.

 

Moreover, the problem is that a new Israeli Government may not have the sharp edges of Mr. Netanyahu’s ultra-nationalists and ultra-conservatives but may be equally unwilling to make the kind of concessions required for a credible peace process. Former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the United States and Britain Turki al Faisal, who is believed to be close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, appeared to echo that sentiment and take it a step further. Responding to Netanyahu’s rejection, US President Joe Biden, wittingly or unwittingly, noted that a two-state solution means different things to different people. The President suggested a two-state solution could involve a demilitarised Palestinian state that would be more palatable for Israeli hardliners. That has long been Israel’s often unspoken definition across the country’s political spectrum with few exceptions, reinforced by Hamas’ October 7 attack in which 1,100 people, mostly civilians were killed. The problem is that Israeli security concerns about Palestinians are a mirror-image of Palestinian security concerns about Israel after more than half a century of occupation and the current Gaza carnage, likely making demilitarization a non-starter for Palestinians. For his part, Netanyahu feels emboldened by Biden’s poor polling in an election year, solid Republican support for Israel, and his past ability to counter a US President domestically in the United States.

 

At the same time, Netanyahu bolstered with his comments the credibility of Iran’s opposition to Arab states normalizing relations with Israel. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cautioned days before Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel that normalisation of relations with Israel amounted to ‘gambling’ that was ‘doomed to failure.’ He warned that countries establishing relations with the Jewish state would be “in harm’s way.” Events since October 7 have reinforced Iran’s sense that the winds of Middle Eastern geopolitics are blowing in its favour. Israel’s conduct in the Gaza war has drawn criticism from much of the international community, except for the United States and several European countries. A potential international court ruling would deepen the dent in Israel’s moral standing inflicted by the war. In addition, Iran’s non-state allies complicate affairs for Israel and the United States. More than three months into the war, Israel has yet to achieve its goals of destroying Hamas and liberating the remaining 139 Hamas-held hostages abducted during the October 7 fighting, including the bodies of those since killed in Gaza. While not directly involving Iranian non-state allies, mounting tensions on the West Bank where Israeli raids and clashes with Palestinian fighters threaten to mushroom into an insurgency, strengthen Iran’s hardline position.