By Girish Linganna 

 

 

 

 

 

THE involvement of Iran in the escalating conflict between Israel and Gaza has been somewhat downplayed and indirect. However, in the last week, a series of direct retaliatory actions by Iran have sparked fresh discussions about Tehran’s strategic objectives. There is growing speculation about whether China might be requested to intervene as a mediator between Iran and its neighbouring countries. This comes as analysts suggest that Iran’s decision to launch air strikes against non-state groups in Pakistan and Iraq earlier this week was based on a possible misjudgement. Tehran presumably believed that neither nation would be inclined to respond with retaliatory actions. In retaliation for Iran’s missile and drone strikes, which targeted purported bases of Israel’s Mossad in northern Iraq and a separate ethnic Baloch insurgent group located in western Pakistan, both Pakistan and Iraq have withdrawn their ambassadors from Tehran. They have also expelled Iranian envoys. These attacks, conducted by Iran against the group fighting in its southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan province, occurred on Monday and Tuesday. According to Abdul Basit, a senior associate fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, Iran’s assumption that Pakistan wouldn’t retaliate, fearing entanglement in the broader Middle-East conflict stemming from the Israel-Gaza war, was certainly a miscalculation on Iran’s part. Indeed, Basit indicated that Pakistan was compelled to respond.

 

He suggested that not retaliating would have projected an image of weakness to India, its long-standing adversary, and to the Taliban insurgents who are currently battling Pakistani security forces from positions in Afghanistan. Iran has described its air strikes in Pakistan, Iraq, and on Islamic State (ISIS) positions in Syria as a response to terrorist attacks that occurred on its soil in December and January. On January 3, twin suicide bombings by ISIS in the southeastern Iranian city of Kerman resulted in the deaths of at least 90 individuals. The attackers were traced by Iranian investigators back to Afghanistan. Ali Alfoneh, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, conveyed to media that the current scenario poses a challenge for Iran, given its lack of interest in entering into a confrontation with the Taliban Government. However, Alfoneh noted that to maintain its reputation and fulfill its promise of retaliation, Iran chose to strike at various non-specific targets in Iraq and Syria, and, in a somewhat unexpected move, also in Pakistan. Alfoneh, author of “Political Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Demise of the Clergy and the Rise of the Revolutionary Guards Corps,” suggested to the media that Iran’s selection of targets is subject to various interpretations.

 

However, factors like the ease of striking these targets and the anticipated minimal repercussions were likely considerations in Iran’s decision-making process. However, he mentioned that the situation with Pakistan is “somewhat distinct”. Iran has generally refrained from direct involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict, choosing instead to act through its allies in the so-called Axis of Resistance. This includes the continuous assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, carried out by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Experts believe that Iran’s strikes in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria are intended to convey messages to its rivals. According to Guy Burton, an independent analyst and former instructor of international politics at the University of Kurdistan Hewler in Arbil – the northern Iraqi city hit by Iran on Monday – one of the key messages is Iran’s demonstration of its status as a regional power with the ability to take decisive action when it deems necessary. The air strikes by Iran also underscored certain vulnerabilities in the region, such as Iraq’s incapacity for retaliation. Furthermore, a third message from Iran, according to Burton, is its capability to indirectly target American and Israeli interests, while likely indicating its preference to avoid escalating the situation into a more direct conflict.

 

Realistically, given its current economic challenges, the Iranian regime is not in a position to handle the potential repercussions of an escalated conflict. Certainly, Tehran is likely deliberating on the extent to which they can intensify confrontations without causing internal unrest that could lead to opposition, potentially jeopardizing the regime’s stability and position, as noted by Burton, author of “China and Middle East Conflicts: Responding to War and Rivalry from the Cold War to the Present.” The timing of the US and UK air strikes against the Houthis, occurring just days apart, not only diminishes Western criticism of Iran’s air strikes but also highlights that both sides are capable of similar military strategies. If China were to attempt to “curb Iranian actions,” specifically in areas where its own interests are at stake, it might encounter resistance, with Iran potentially leveraging its relationship with India. Similar to China’s involvement in developing Pakistan’s Gwadar port, Iran aims to advance the Chabahar port, with support from India, following an agreement between the two nations this Monday. Thus, Tehran might perceive any disruptions at Gwadar as a beneficial scenario for them and Chabahar, Burton noted. “The Chinese and Iranians do not agree on everything,” he added.