Removal Of Judge

 

 

 

 

 

By Adv. R. S. Agrawal 

 

 

JUSTICE Atul S Chandurkar and Justice Jitendra Jain, at the Principal Seat of the Bombay High Court, have reiterated the well-settled legal position regarding the narrow scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in all matters, particularly in service matters and unless the decision making process is shown to be vitiated, the Court should not exercise its discretion and jurisdiction as an Appellate Court. The division bench at the HC has stated in the decision –Aniruddha Ganesh Pathak v. Registrar General and the State Law and Judiciary Secretary, Mumbai, that in service matters, an employer is the best judge to consider the allegation and the punishment to be imposed and unless the process of establishing the charges and imposing the punishment has not been followed in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the Court would and should be slow in interfering in such matters. This writ petition was filed by A G Pathak for getting quashed the impugned order passed by the Maharashtra Law and Judiciary Department, Mumbai on January 14, 2022 for removing the petitioner from the judicial service. He had also prayed for reinstatement in Service with consequential benefits. On March 19, 2010, the petitioner was appointed as a Civil, Judge, Junior Division.

 

During the tenure of his service, he was posted at various districts till the date of his removal. It is also necessary, according to the High Court, to take into consideration its judgement in the case – High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v Shashikant S Patil and Another – (2000)1 SCC 416 as regards the scope available for this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while considering a challenge to an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the High Court. In this case under consideration before the High Court, it is not the case of the petitioner that there has been a violation of decision making process in arriving at the conclusion which is reflected in the impugned order of January 14, 2022 and rightly so. The petitioner was given Memorandum of charges on May 7, 2018 along with all the supporting documents. The petitioner was given a show cause by the Disciplinary Committee to give his say on Charges-1,6 and 7. The petitioner replied to the said Show Cause Notice issued by the Disciplinary Committee. The respondent-Registrar General arrived at the finding that these 3 charges have been proved and consequently thereafter, imposed punishment of removal from judicial service in accordance with Rule 5(1)(viii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (D&A) Rules, 1979.

 

Therefore, in the HC’s view no fault can be found in the decision making process adopted by the respondents and, therefore, to that extent, this Court would not be inclined to interfere in the impugned order. It is a universally accepted norm that Judges and Judicial Officers must act with dignity and must not indulge in as conduct or behaviour which is likely to affect the image of judiciary or which is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. If the Members of the Judiciary indulge in a behavior which is blameworthy or which is unbecoming of a judicial Officer, the Writ Courts are not expected to intervene and grant relief to such a Judicial Officer. Ordinarily, an order terminating services of a Judicial Officer by passing an order of dismissal from service or other on the recommendation of the HC as contemplated under Article 235 of the Constitution of India would be liable to be interfered with broadly on proof of a breach of a Constitutional provision, principles of natural justice or the applicable service rules. The HC has noted that in the judgment of the case – Nawal Singh v State of UP and Another –(2003)8 SCC 117, the SC has held that judicial service cannot be treated as a service in the sense of employment. Judges, while discharging their functions exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State and hence standards expected to be maintained are of the highest nature.

 

The petitioner had not challenged the impugned order on the ground of mala fides. The report of PDJ, Nandurbar of February 17, 2017 records what he found and saw on his visit to Shahda Court on November 25, 2016. In the said report, it has been recorded that the appearance and body language of the petitioner was not of a normal person and further the petitioner was also personally asked to behave properly by the PDJ, Shahda. On enquiry from staff, Bar and others, serious complaints against the petitioner surfaced. It was also revealed by those who know that he used to come to Court after taking drink, and has not been punctual. It has not been the case of the petitioner that the person, who has prepared the report is biased against the him. A report by the District Judge, Jalgaon, who visited Shahda is also on similar lines. The Disciplinary Committee has agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer after discussing the evidence. It cannot be said that the impugned order is perverse and without any application of mind. Therefore, in the HC’s view, it cannot reach conclusion that the findings of the Disciplinary Committee can be said to be perverse or without any material in support thereof.

 

The Court cannot sit over the decision of the respondents to re-appreciate the evidence to conclude that the punishment is not justified and is disproportionate on the basis of evidence on record. All evidence go to prove that the petitioner was regularly under the influence of liquor. The HC has stated that it has no reason to reach the finding that, on the basis of material, the Disciplinary committee’s finding fault with the petitioner in the case to the extent of recommending his removal from the post cannot be said to be perverse. According to the High Court, the contention of the petitioner, that the punishment is disproportionate is also without merits. The fact, that the petitioner was a Judge, his conduct and behaviour has to be above par is a very crucial aspect, which has to be considered for imposing the punishment. The evidence on record clearly prove charge Nos 1, 6 and 7 and the petitioner had lost the faith of not only the Bar, but also of the Bench and staff working with him on account of his conduct, therefore, discretion having been exercised without any arbitrariness by the respondents, the High Court has no reason to interfere in the respondents’ decision.