Another Judge’s Ouster

 

 

 

 

By Adv. R. S. Agrawal 

 

 

 

THE dismissal of Judicial Officer, Aniruddha Ganesh Pathak (52), (from Akola) ‘s writ petition by the Bombay High Court division bench consisting of Justice Atul S Chandurkar and Justice Jitendra Jain on April 23, 2024, has been followed by similar result in the case of another Judicial Officer, Pradeep Hiraman Kale (50, from Yavatmal) on April 29, 2024, whose petition against his removal from services, has also yielded adverse verdict to him by the Court. The petitioner Kale has been the judicial officer appointed in 2009 by the State Government After receipt of the complaints, the petitioner was served with Articles of Charge on July 5, 2017 by framing 3 charges. Along with Articles of Charge, the petitioner was furnished with statement of imputation, copy of anonymous complaint along with compact disk (CD) Copy of complaint of December 16, 2013 of Bilal Sultan Mistry, conversation recorded in the CD, copy of complaint of January 18, 2014 from Babbu Mehbul Khan and copy of conversation recorded in the CD sent by the said complainant, report of Principal District Judge, Ratnagiri along with annexures copy of statement of Advocate S S Butala. List of witnesses were also furnished to the petitioner. Charge No 1 related to acceptance of bribe through Harish Keer, peon, attached to the petitioner, in connection with acquittal of an accused for an offence punishable under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, (POCSO) Act, 2012.

 

In the said charge, it was mentioned that complainants approached the said peon for getting acquittal order in POCSO case. There were telephonic conversation between the complainant and the peon Harish. Initially, the demand was for Rs 3 lakh and thereafter it is stated that on the request made by the complainant, the said peon after consulting the petitioner agreed to give Rs two lakh, out of which Rs 40,000/- were accepted in cash and balance was paid in cheque, which was to be returned after receipt of cash. On February 28, 2018, the respondent-2, the HC Registrar General, after perusing the charges and defence statement decided to drop charge Nos 2 and 3. However, with regard to the charge No 1, it was decided to hold Departmental Enquiry. The PDJ, Ratnagiri, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and the Adhoc DJ and Addl Sessions Judge, Ratnagiri as the Presenting Officer. The copy of the said letter was sent to the petitioner. After recording of the oral evidence on October 29, 2018, the Enquiry Officer came to a conclusion that the accused-peon demanded and accepted amount from the complainants, but it was not proved that that the petitioner was associated with him for the said purpose and probability of instigation by other person to the accused peon on his own initiation cannot be ruled out, and therefore, the petitioner was not guilty of Charge No. 1. Still, the Disciplinary Authority after considering the reply of the petitioner, found the petitioner guilty of Charge No 1 and recommended his removal.

 

Pursuant thereto the State Government passed the impugned order on December 5, 2019, removing the petitioner from Government service. At this stage, the petitioner approached the High Court. The High Court has noted that in the decision of the case – Nawal Singh v. State of UP and Another-(2003) 8 SCC 117, it has been held that judicial service cannot be treated as a service in the sense of employment. Judges discharging their functions exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State and hence standards expected to be maintained are of the highest degree. In the High Court’s view, the parameters required for conducting disciplinary enquiry cannot be compared with the parameters required in criminal trial. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct against the delinquent employee and such charge is to be proved on the basis of principles of preponderance of probability and not on strict rules of evidence. In this case, after perusing the evidence on record, the High Court is of the view that the impugned order cannot be termed as perverse, but is based upon the principles of preponderance of probability. The High Court has also observed that considering the position in which petitioner was employed, the punishment has to be proportionate to maintain dignity and respect of the judiciary and instill confidence and faith of the litigants in the justice delivery system. According to the High Court, the petitioner ought to have led evidence to dislodge the charge, which he has failed. The principle of strict proof cannot be applied to disciplinary Authority proceedings, more so, when it comes to judicial service.

 

The Disciplinary Authority has given reasons for not agreeing with the Enquiry Officer’s report. The said Authority has stated that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were contrary to the settled law in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. It may not be that in all cases of bribe, the delinquent officer would be personally involved in demanding the same. The High Court has noted that timing of acquittal and fact that the accused was acquitted by the petitioner in the POCSO case. In the High Court’s view the Disciplinary Authority has given detailed reasons for not accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The said disagreement based on the detailed reasons, is in accordance with the settled position that it is not necessary that in all cases the Disciplinary Committee should accept the findings of the Enquiry Officer. This, in addition to other evidences, which has come on record clearly show, based on preponderance of probability that the petitioner can be certainly said to be involved in the incident for which he has been charged. According to the HC, if the Members of the judiciary indulge in a behaviour which is blameworthy or which is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, the Writ Courts are not expected to intervene and grant relief to such a Judicial Officer. In view of this and “looked from any angle”, this is not a fit case for the Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. With this conclusion, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition.