By VIJAY PHANSHIKAR :
 
The situation in July 1999
●“Nawaz Sharif visited China to obtain support for a cease fire. Later,
prompted by Musharraf, he met US President Clinton in Washington DC on
4 July. That morning, Tiger Hill had been captured before their meeting was
held. Nawaz Sharif requested Clinton to intervene or persuade India to pull
back troops from the remaining areas on our side. Our operations, however
continued. By 10 July, Pakistanis had been evicted from most of Batalik and
Ras, and some areas of Kaksar. In Mushkoh, 50 Para Bde was poised for
mopping up.
 
“Vice Admiral Khattak (Retd) of the Pakistan Navy in his paper
‘Investigating Kargil’ has written, ‘During much of the eight weeks
preceding the 4 July meeting in Washington, we had looked helplessly at TV
images of pinpoint artillery shoots and resultant instant pulverisation of
some of the nation’s bravest sons on such a mountainous salient in the war
zone as Point 5140 (Batalik), Three Pimples (Dras) and Tiger Hill’. ...”
- Excerpt from the classic analysis
of the Kargil conflict by
General Ved Prakash Malik,
the then Chief of Staff of the Indian Army
(appearing in Gyan Chakra on India’s Military Strategy
-- Journal 2023).
● “The committee had overwhelming evidence that the Pakistani armed
intrusion in the Kargil sector came as a complete and total surprise to the
Indian Government, Army, Intelligence agencies as well to the J&K State
Government and even its agencies. No agency or individual had been able to
realise before the event the possibility of such a large scale Pakistani
intrusion. ...”
- Excerpt from the Kargil Review Committee
Report

TIME it is to connect the two dots -- going back in time, so as to understand what Kargil conflict should mean to India and how the country’s security thought-process has been redefined or reinvented by master-minds in the past quarter of a century. There may still be many a lacunae in the exercise, as experts may point out. Yet, the overall forward stride India has made since then is remarkable in every which the sense. Time it is, therefore, to celebrate that fluid dynamism demonstrated by India’s strategic brains, and time also it is to cerebrate how to go forward from here. Even in 1999 when Kargil intrusion took place, India responded with a stunning smartness -- which the statement of Vice Admiral Khattak of the Pakistan Navy indicates (as quoted by General V.P. Malik). Of course, as the Kargil Review Committee Report asserts, the country was taken fully by surprise by the intrusion. Yet, the manner in which India responded was something that pushed the world into a bowl of surprises. In a remarkably short time, overcoming whatever lacunae in the system, the Indian Armed Forces responded to throw the intruding Pakistanis out. By now, the nation has known the full account of what actually happened in the summer of 1999 within just a few weeks after the Lahore Declaration by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

 

Facts have established beyond doubt that Pakistan indulged in one of its worst misadventures when some of its top military brains cooked the Kargil conspiracy. True, India recovered from the surprise quickly and responded in a befitting manner. But the Indian response did not stop there. The country’s strategic brains and its national leadership learned quick and deep lessons from Kargil -- and recalibrated their thought and action to suit the changing strategic needs as per emerging threat perceptions. Judging by the cumulative response India offered at that moment and in later years, there is reason for us to (sort of) thank Pakistan for that misadventure. For, now India is extremely well prepared not just for that kind of sly intrusion, but for any kind of hostility by any enemy. Learning from the Kargil experience, India has moved to have a Chief of Defence Service (CDS) to offer an integrated command to the cumulative military strength of the country.

 

The concept of integrated command is far different from what many military brains describe as ‘jointness’ of action, so to say. And to top it all, the Indian strategic masterminds have adopted the concept of Theatre Command not just in the territorial domain but at the apex of the military pyramid. Very easily can anybody now say that India has moved forward from Kargil in a manner whose detail is beyond easy fathoming. Back then in post-Kargil time, Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto later said in sheer exasperation: “Kargil was the biggest blunder in the history of Pakistan.” She knew what Kargil did to Pakistan by way of damage ... ... and what it will do to India by way of future advantage. Pakistan has paid dearly for that blunder -- and will keep paying all the time. For, India subjected its strategic consideration to a paradigm shift of a futuristic kind. India altered its idea of any military confrontation -- and expanded its scope to domains that had never crossed the Indian thought-process before. That is exactly why everybody who understands national security can say, “We are best prepared for any kind of security challenge”. And ‘everybody’ includes those who fought in the Kargil War or those who later were part of the Kargil Review Committee. Slowly but surely, India’s security diction changed post-Kargil. India’s concept of future war, too, changed after that. And even when many soldiers of repute -- current or veteran -- say that Pakistan would never rectify its stilted thought-process and that many Kargillike instances may happen even now onwards.

 

Yet, the country’s preparedness has moved into the ‘real-time’ zone. In other words, India’s response to any Pakistani misadventure would be absolutely immediate -- real-time ! Twenty-five years ago, when Kargil happened, General V.P. Malik, then the chief of the Indian Army, was travelling abroad. On his return, he moved quickly to spearhead the response. The whole security apparatus moved -- in complete alignment with the political establishment led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. That story is too well known to be told again in full detail. Suffice, therefore, it is to glean the right lesson from the experience -- which most fortunately India has done. For General Malik, however, Kargil had some other meaning as well. For, on September 30, 1997 when General Malik took over as the Army chief from General Shankar Roychowdhury, and went home to join his wife on their 29th wedding anniversary, he got a call from the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) informing him of the very heavy shelling of the Kargil town by the Pakistanis -- claiming several civilian casualties and damage to property. The new chief approved a suggestion by the top brass of the Northern Command that Pakistani guns be hit the next morning in retaliation. Kargil, thus, got entwined with General Malik’s career as Army chief. This is not just an anecdotal detail, however. For, it indicates how Pakistan had been viewing Kargil as a starting point of its exercise to gain back Siachen whose heights India occupied.

 

The Pakistani military brains treated Kargil as a critical point from where Paki Army could choke India’s National highway 1A and later claim Siachen back through pointed and concerted military action. In other words, preparations for what happened later in Kargil were afoot even on the day General Malik took over as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) well over one and a half years earlier. Even as Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus, the sly build up of Pakistani personnel in Kargil heights had been going on for months -- complete with artillery deployment and ordnance and other supplies having been stocked up right there for operations that could take long. The only big mistake in the Pakistani calculations were that its military brains did not anticipate a very quick and well-organised Indian response once the intrusion came to notice. True, initial days were really tough for the Indian soldiers as they fought not just the enemy perched in safe heights but also a very hostile terrain. Indian leadership -- military as well as political -- was smart enough to enlist the support of the Air and Naval Forces as well, thus getting ready for a bigger confrontation if needed. To sound politically right, India did declare to the world that its Forces would never cross the international border while fending off the Pakistani intruders. But on the sly, it was fully ready to do so as a strategic and tactical need. And soon, the Pakistanis were on the run -- as indicated from the hapless statement of Vice Admiral Khattak of the Pakistan Navy at that time. India scored a decisive victory -- and went on to start reshaping its strategic doctrine to suit all future challenges. That process still goes on, and will go on until India achieves a greater degree of self-reliance in defence production and operational superiority not just against Pakistan but also against China. For, what India now sees as complete strategic preparedness is a concept of the complete security eco-system.

 

General Malik captures this idea in apt words in the Preface to his 2006 book -- Kargil -- From Surprise To Victory: ‘When a soldier goes out to perform his duty, he sublimates his individuality into that of his organisation. He works in unison with his fellow-soldiers, trusting them completely. He strives to accomplish his mission whatever be the consequences -- even if it means sacrificing his own life. ...’ ! The total strategic thought, thus, has that soldier in focus -- to offer him a comprehensive eco-system of thought and action aided by whatever is needed by way of technology and technique -- standing on deep, futuristic thinking. Twenty-five years ago, Kargil experience sparked that effort. Twenty-five years since Kargil, that effort has assumed a sensible shape. Twenty-five years hence, the effort will be still on -- with equal, unmitigated intensity. This is the essence of the metaphor called Kargil.