“The Henderson BrooksBhagat Report is the report of an investigative commission,which conducted an Operations Review of the Indian Army's operation during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. It was commissioned by General J. N. Chaudhuri, the Acting Army Chief at the time. Its authors were Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier Premindra Singh Bhagat, a Victoria Cross recipient and a former director of Military Intelligence. The report was mainly written by Brig. Bhagat. The Government of India has left the report classified, citing national security reasons.

 

The lessons learned from it were summarised by Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan in the Indian Parliament. The functioning of the Army Headquarters was outside the purview of the commission, as was the civilian direction of the army,as according to some scholars, General Chaudhuri did not want to ‘dig too deeply’ into the conduct of the top military echelon. According to R.D.Pradhan,the private secretary of Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan, the report was in seven bound volumes, along with appendices. There were two copies of the report, one with General Chaudhuri and the second with Chavan under Pradhan's own care. The report was critical of the Indian Army high command of the time as well as of the execution of operations. It states that the Indian government, which would have been keen to recover territory, advocated a cautious policy, but that the Army Headquarters dictated a policy that was militarily unsound. Some analysts argue that the continuing public controversy over the report indicates that many of the problems identified in the report still continue. - Wikipedia T HE observation that many of the reasons that led to India’s debacle in 1962 still continue -- which is why the Government -- no matter its leaning -- has chosen to keep the Brooks-Bhagat Report under wraps, is only lopsided, so to say. Much water, of course, has flowed under the bridge and India’s massive effort -- at least in the last decade or so -- is visible to the world.

 

In the few face-offs between the Indian and the Chinese forces in the past 5-6 years, India has shown a remarkable toughness that has by now come to characterise the India’s China policy and its diplomatic and military or strategic stance. Despite this, many questions still linger in popular mind. Many people who “know things” insist even now that India was made to face the ignominy of defeat and an overall beating even in diplomacy because the national leadership of that time did not show appropriate pragmatism that would have enabled it to take flexible decisions that would have eventually blunted the Chinese aggression to a great extent. And because there has been no clarity of information on the history of those times -- particularly in regard to the events of five years preceding 1962 and the military confrontation, a lot of free-wheeling interpretation -- not always backed by solid facts -- keeping doing the rounds. This has given the Opposition (current) enough opportunity to raise the issue quite unwisely in an attempt to bring a bad name to the Narendra Modi Government.

 

That incessant clatter led Prime Minister Mr. Modi to expose some of the weakspots of the Government of that time. This makes it necessary for the Government to bring out a detailed analysis of that dark chapter of India’s history. Let us not think the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report as the ultimate statement on the issue -- since its scope had been kept limited only to some parts of the story. But time appears to have come for the Indian nation to start asking for more detailed information and analysis of those times when India became a laughing stock in the world. True, a few elements in the global arena -- such as the then American President Mr. John F. Kennedy, or some sections of the then Soviet Union’s leadership - - did offer some help to India, all right. Unfortunately, however, the Indian national leadership did not seem to be in a position to accept that advice or help because of its own weak-kneed approach to national security - - which appeared so much in contrast with the stance the Chinese adopted during those times. There are enough reasons available in public domain today to believe that much of the diplomatic confusion that dominated Indian handling of the situation stemmed from the indecisive Prime Minister India had in Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Several records are available - - of course in different versions of those times in book by various authors. Some of those people were actually engaged in political, diplomatic and military actions then. So, to a large extent, their recordings of the events in those times do carry the weight of correctness.

 

The Government must dig out every such record possible and present a no-nonsense report to the nation. If the Henderson BrooksBhagat Report has something really incendiary, then the nation must know it. For, no national record can be kept away from public knowledge for as long as sixty-plus years. Until that happens, the people will keep suspecting a terrible foul-play all the time.